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A B S T R A C T 
Money laundering, in its almost 90-year-long history, 
has attracted the attention of the scientific, professional, 
but also the general public. Throughout the entire pe-
riod, the manifestations of this criminal phenomenon, 
its typology, etiological factors, etc., have changed, but 
the essence has remained the same: the transformation 
of illegally acquired money into legal financial flows. 
Emerging markets are particularly burdened, which is 
the subject of this paper: identifying, monitoring and 
proving the process of money laundering with the aim 
to reduce it in developing countries. In addition, what 
can be observed in these markets is that money launder-
ing operations are mainly related to those activities 
where most of the payments are made in cash. Their 
specificity, that is, the basic motive for execution, is not 
just a profit, but the aspiration to introduce “dirty” 
money into legal flows. The aim of this paper is to use 
the method of description to explain and describe sci-
entifically the money laundering process and to combat 
this phenomenon with a focus on the characteristics of 
the money laundering process. In addition, the paper de-
scribes the models and weaknesses of this process, 
while at the same time it respects the standards and spe-
cifics of business operations in emerging markets. The 
result of the paper is that it provides an overview of 
money laundering in the 21st century in small and open 
economies, including proposals to prevent and combat 
this negative phenomenon. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of “money laundering” is interesting to the general public due 
to its complexity, difficult detection of perpetrators and proof of guilt, but also 
the history of this criminal phenomenon.1 On the other hand, the scientific public 
mentions this phenomenon when it talks about organized crime, severe forms of 
corruption (e.g. some “bankruptcy”, “privatization” or some other famous “ma-
fia” group), i.e. financing of terrorism (see more: Ridley, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 
Palifka, 2018; Kyriakos-Saad, Esposito, Schwarz, 2012; Chaikin, Sharman, 
2009; Irwin, Raymond Choo, Liu, 2011; Teichmann, 2020). In the professional 
community, an increase in expenditures with the aim of extracting money from 
a certain project is often wrongly described as “money laundering” (Gordon, 
2011, p. 507). Money laundering is, as Unger (2007) puts it: “a growth industry 
involving a large number of countries and law enforcement agencies together 
with non-governmental, intergovernmental, multilateral and supranational or-
ganizations” (p. 6). Despite attempts to express the amounts of “laundered 
money” (Walker, 1999), it all comes down to estimates of the amount and num-
ber of “launderers” because it is a “mysterious phenomenon and its scope is dif-
ficult to measure, especially because the most successful methods are still un-
known”(Pedić, 2010, p. 618; Walker, 1999; Levi & Reuter, 2006; Jullum, 
Løland, Huseby, Ånonsen, & Lorentzen, 2020). According to estimates by the 
International Monetary Fund two to five percent of the world economy is made 
up of laundered money2 (International Monetary Fund, 1998), while the United 
                                                     
 It is widely believed that the method of “money laundering” was developed by the famous Amer-
ican criminal Al Capone. He legalized the money earned from gambling, prostitution, racketeering 
and the sale of alcoholic beverages during the Prohibition in America in the 1920s, presenting it 
as an income from the chain of his automatic laundries. Namely, one of his business ventures was 
a company in which citizens washed and dried their clothes in machines, paying with coins. He 
presented the illegally acquired money as income received from coins inserted into washing ma-
chines in which citizens washed clothes. He paid taxes on that income properly and the money 
flowed into legal flows - it was “laundered” (Katušić-Jergović, 2007: 619-620). 
 Mr. Michel Camdessus said in his speech (“Money Laundering: the Importance of International 
Countermeasures”) at the Plenary Meeting of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laun-
dering on February 10, 1998: “I hardly need to say that the IMF regards the anti-money laundering 
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Nations estimates that the amount of money laundered is about 3.6% of global 
GDP (2.3% -5.5%), which is equivalent to about $ 2.1 billion (UNODC, 2011, 
p. 7). On the other hand, a well-known body for combating money laundering 
and financing of terrorism, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), claims that 
the exact amounts of “laundered” money are impossible to determine (FATF, 
2020). 
In essence, money laundering is a process by which criminals try to hide the true 
origin and ownership of property gained through criminal activities (Mei, Ye & 
Gao, 2014). In this paper, we observe money laundering from another point of 
view, as an increase in the income of a company with the aim of paying taxes on 
the realized “profit” from business and introducing money gained from activities 
into legal flows. 
The report of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(2019) lists the jobs as ideal money laundering activities performed by real estate 
and insurance agencies, casinos, goldsmiths, catering establishments, restaurants 
and jewellery shops (p. 17). So, the most desirable money laundering jobs are 
those where there is a lot of cash payment. In short, the motive for “laundering” 
money is to show illegally obtained money, which was earned through tax eva-
sion or illegal activities, so that it seems to be legally earned. In both cases, these 
are non-market and unethical moves. Most importantly, the source of money 
laundering are cash transactions that do not have official documents. Owners of 
companies registered for the mentioned activities can simply show higher than 
actual turnover with little or no increase in expenses. The most important thing 
is to pay the tax in the end and the money will enter legal flows. A more subtle 
way involves depositing money in banks from exotic countries that guarantee 
                                                     
actions advocated by the FATF as crucial for the smooth functioning of the financial markets. 
While we cannot guarantee the accuracy of our figures - and you have certainly a better evaluation 
than we have - the estimates of the present scale of money laundering transactions are almost 
beyond imagination - 2 to 5 percent of global GDP would probably be a consensus range….” 
(International Monetary Fund, 2018, quoted in: UNODC, 2011, 19).  
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discreet business operations. These forms essentially coexist with money laun-
dering as an integral part of illegal trade outside the illegal market and without 
the participation of professional perpetrators (Malm&Bichler, 2013, p. 380). 
Despite the usual public opinion, money can be rather easily transferred from 
legal flows to illegal ones. It is enough “just” not to issue a fiscal invoice to the 
buyer. However, unlike “money laundering”, this phenomenon – “taking out the 
money” is much easier to identify and sanction. By distinguishing money “laun-
dering” and getting money “dirty”, it is easy to conclude that a false increase in 
the actual cost of a job with the aim of gaining property is a covert robbery. In 
the modern financial systems, that our society strives for, the circumstances un-
der which transfers of a larger amount of money are made, are checked. There 
are usually limits on the amount for which the origin of money does not need to 
be proven.3 
Advocates of a political philosophy that supports personal freedoms believe that 
the hunt for money launderers is successful only if all countries make the same 
moves. Similar to the paradox of the “prisoner’s dilemma”, a country that does 
not participate in it profits, while others are unnecessarily exhausted. If countries 
did everything in a harmonized way, the benefit would be greater than the sum 
of the current amounts. However, even with full coordination, there will still be 
countries that will, for various reasons, lag behind. Therefore, as the easiest and 
most effective of all known ways to fight dirty money, they suggest the legaliza-
tion of “brighter” activities which “dirty” money, such as soft drugs or gambling, 
comes from. They assume that adults are sufficiently aware and responsible to-
wards themselves and their family. In this regard, one should not spend the 
money of all taxpayers to repair, restrain or constrain another’s vice. Moreover, 
these activities may even be taxed additionally. In this regard, the moves of the 
authorities in Uruguay and the Netherlands to allow the trade in cannabis and its 
cultivation are interesting. Certain benefits of “decriminalization” are possible. 
                                                     
 The amount in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 30,000 BAM and more (Article 6, Paragraph 1, Item 
b) of the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorist Activities). 
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“Forbidden fruit” will be more easily accessible, which will increase tax reve-
nues and free space for more efficient engagement of the police, judiciary, health 
care and prisons. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The phenomenon of money laundering is conditioned, as Michael Levi and Mel-
vin Soudijn (2020) explain, by the type of approach: economic or legal (p. 4-6). 
This phenomenon is also defined as a series of activities used to conceal income 
from criminal activity and present them as originating from legal activities (April 
& Grasso, 2001, p. 1054). The content of the term money laundering implies the 
activity of subjects, most often those in the field of grey economy and organized 
crime, who create conditions for legalization of illegally obtained profit which 
covers its criminal origin and creates a show of legal activity (Meštrović, 2002, 
p. 147). The phenomenon of money laundering encompasses all types of post-
criminal activities directed at concealing property gain or value obtained in ille-
gal way, by investing in a financial and non-financial system with the ultimate 
goal of “cleansing” money (Tiwari, Gepp & Kumar, 2020). 
The criminal offense of concealing illegally obtained money is necessarily re-
lated to the phenomenon of “dirty” money, i.e. the phrase “money laundering” 
(Milovanović, 2008, p. 32). However, legal systems vary from country to coun-
try.4In order to overcome certain legal concepts in practice, and to enable stand-
ardization, it is recommended to introduce standardized terminology in order to 
reduce the risk of error to a minimum. According to the definition of the FATF 
(2020): “money laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise 
their illegal origin” (FATF, 2020). United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime (2000) in Article 6 defines money laundering as: “(i) 
                                                     
 For example: in our criminal justice system, money laundering is stipulated in Article 280 of the 
Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska (2017). This criminal offense is committed by a person 
who receives, exchanges, keeps, disposes of or uses in corporate or other business or conceals or 
tries to conceal money or property he knows was obtained as a commission of criminal offense. 
The prescribed sentence is imprisonment for a term between six months and five years.  
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The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the pro-
ceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of 
the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the 
predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action; (ii) The 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, move-
ment or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such prop-
erty is the proceeds of crime.” 
In our criminal justice system5 money laundering is stipulated in Article 280 of 
the Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska (2017). The essence of the behaviour 
stipulated as a criminal offense of money laundering is in undertaking certain 
actions by the perpetrator, in order to integrate into the legal financial flows the 
property which was acquired by some previously committed crime6, when the 
perpetrator knows the criminal origin of that property (Đorđević, 2016, p. 152). 
This criminal offense is committed by a person who receives, exchanges, keeps, 
disposes of or uses in corporate or other business or conceals or tries to conceal 
money or property. The prescribed sentence is imprisonment from six months to 
five years. There are also two more difficult forms, that is, if the perpetrator of 
the basic form is at the same time the perpetrator or accomplice in the criminal 
offense by which the money or property was obtained, i.e. if the value of the 
                                                     
 Also, the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorist Activities (2014), 
stipulates that money laundering implies (Article 2): conversion or transfer of property, when such 
property is derived from criminal activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in such activity to evade the legal 
consequences of his or her action (Paragraph 1); the concealment or disguise of the true nature, 
source location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, when 
such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity 
(Paragraph 2); the acquisition, possession or use of property derived from criminal activity or from 
an act of participation in such activity (Paragraph 3); participation in, association to commit, at-
tempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of any of the 
actions mentioned above (Paragraph 4); the purpose, knowledge of or intent required as elements 
of the money laundering action may be concluded on the basis of objective and factual circum-
stances (Paragraph 5). 
 Previously committed criminal offense or predicate criminal offense may be any criminal offense 
whose commission resulted in obtaining property which is a subject of the criminal activity of 
money laundering (Stojanović, 2018, p. 806). 
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money or property exceeds the amount of 200,000 BAM. In the first case, the 
imprisonment of one to eight years and a fine are prescribed, while in the second 
case, a heavier sentence is threatened (imprisonment from two to ten years and 
a fine). The most severe form exists if the said acts were committed by several 
persons who joined together to perform money laundering or money laundering 
was performed for the purpose of financing terrorism, for which a prison sen-
tence of three to fifteen years and a fine are prescribed. Finally, a privileged form 
is prescribed, if during the commission of the criminal offense the perpetrator 
acted negligently in relation to the circumstance when the money or property 
gain was obtained by a criminal offense, as well as the obligation to confiscate 
money, property gain, income, profit or other gain benefits obtained by the 
crime. What we can see from the essence of the criminal offense of money laun-
dering is that it is fully harmonized with the stated international legal standards 
that regulate this area. By its nature, the criminal offense of money laundering is 
a special form of the criminal offense of concealment (Stojanović,2018, p. 805), 
due to which the acquisition of these criminal offenses is not possible, i.e. money 
laundering is in apparent concurrence with the criminal offense of concealment 
by specialty (Delić, 2006, p. 350). However, the protection of the object of this 
crime should be taken into account, and considering that it is the economy and 
payment operations, then it is clear that money laundering is significantly more 
than concealing criminal property and has greater criminal significance. 
The nature of the money laundering process reflects a process that seeks to por-
tray money coming from one source as coming from another. Money laundering 
is a process that requires some planning, organizing and coordinating multiple 
activities, so it often involves more people. The characteristics of the process of 
organized crime in money laundering are: large scale, group activities, i.e. it is 
most often carried out by more than one person and is a long-term continuous 
criminal activity that is carried out despite the borders of countries. Money laun-
dering can typically be divided into three stages: the placement phase, the layer-
ing phase, and the integration phase, (Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008, p. 6; 
Beare & Schneider, 2007, p. 141). 
The placement phase presents the first part of the process in which funds, most 
often cash, are invested in the financial system or used as a means of payment 
for the acquisition of various values (Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008, p. 6). 
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The essence is that the money gained through crime is inserted into legal business 
flows. This phase is the most important part of the process for detecting dirty 
money because at that moment it is easiest to discover the nature and origin of 
the funds. It is common to use cash in criminal activities, in order to avoid iden-
tifying the entities involved in such work. Thus, such money cannot be used 
without discovering the perpetrators of the illicit activity by which the funds 
were created. At the same time, high amounts of cash arouse attention and sus-
picion, so there is an attempt to convert it from that form to another, which is 
adequate for further - clean use, as soon as possible. Given that, according to the 
regulations of most countries, banks and other financial institutions are obliged 
to report every major transaction, from the position of the perpetrator, this is the 
most risky phase. 
In the layering phase, an attempt is made to conceal the true origin of the owner 
of the money through (usually numerous) transactions in order to hide the trace 
of the source. This phase is characterized by a series of often individually legiti-
mate transactions, which have the illegal goal of “separating funds from an ille-
gal source” (Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008, p. 8). The most commonly used 
techniques in this phase are: “smuggling currencies, currency exchange, remit-
tances, using fictitious companies, using insurance companies, using box office 
and resident mail, using import-export companies, account manipulation, guar-
antee manipulation, securities manipulation, using casino, business operations 
through offshore zones and certain cash purchases” (Katušić-Jergović, 2007, p. 
622). This phase is characterized by frequent transfers between banks and remit-
tances between different accounts opened under different names in different 
countries. 
In the integration phase, actors integrate their assets into the financial system by 
merging them with legally earned funds. This process makes it difficult to detect 
the real source of money because it is invested in activities that take place in 
accordance with the law (Beare& Schneider, 2007, p. 169). At this stage of the 
process, the most popular methods of the launderers are (Katušić-Jergović, 2007, 
622-623): 
– establishment of anonymous companies in countries where secrecy is 
guaranteed; 
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– sending fake export-import invoices from one country to another where 
they overestimate the goods and 
– money transfer to a bank in a tax haven. 
These three basic stages (placement, layering, integration) appear separately 
and/or at different levels, but they can take place simultaneously, and they can 
even overlap. Therefore, the individual phases often cannot be differentiated 
(Šikman, 2011, 203). 
Instead of the names of individual stages, the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering - FATF and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
(2015) recommend the terms hide, move, and invest. Hiding would reflect the 
fact that cash is often introduced into the system through companies that may, 
consciously or unconsciously, be part of a money laundering mechanism. The 
relocation clearly indicates that the money launderer uses transfers, sales and 
purchases of property and changes the type and size of money in order to hide 
the trace between money and the crime, i.e. between money and the perpetrator. 
The investment technique implies that the perpetrator spends money and can in-
vest in property or lifestyle (p. 5). 
Undoubtedly, these stages in practice are not clearly separate and clearly recog-
nizable. Namely, they often overlap so that in each of them “dirty” money is 
mixed with the legally acquired money. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for 
large respectable financial systems or respectable individuals, but also individual 
countries, to accept and provide “services” to the criminal milieu. (Katušić-Jer-
gović, 2007, p. 623). The result of such concessions is increased corruption that 
regenerates again the whole process. 
The appearance of money laundering is characterized by several types. The most 
common include offshore bank methods, smurfing (known as structuring), un-
derground/alternative banking, fictitious firms, currency exchanges, and double 
invoicing (Salinger, 2005, p. 78). 
Money launderers often send money through various offshore accounts to coun-
tries that allow anonymous use of accounts for any purpose and amount. Busi-
ness operations through these accounts often involve a large number of bank 
transfers to and from offshore accounts. The most famous offshore centres are 
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exotic countries: the Bahamas, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, the Antilles, Pan-
ama, but also developed countries such as Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Singapore (Masciandaro, 2017). 
Building a deposit (English smurfing) implies separation of large amount of 
money into smaller amounts because they are less suspicious. In principle, these 
are amounts that do not exceed the limits of the amounts over which banks are 
obliged to report the transaction to the regulators. Dirty money, divided into 
smaller amounts, is deposited in more accounts with the help of more people 
(smurf) over a longer period. 
Underground or alternative banking implies established legal alternative banking 
systems that enable undocumented deposits and transfers. Such deals are based 
on trust, leave no traces, and operate outside the control of the regulator. For 
example, a “launderer” deposits money in an underground bank, and something 
unobservable such as a half of postcard, ticket or card, is usually used as an iden-
tification confirmation for a transaction, “one half of which is retained by the 
client and the other sent to an overseas banker (Katušić-Jergović , 2007, p. 624). 
The money launderer in the target country shows his confirmation to withdraw 
his/her money, while avoiding taking cash out of the country and reducing the 
risk of detection. 
One of the most common models of money laundering is through fictitious com-
panies. These are companies that exist only for the purpose of money launder-
ing - following the example of automatic laundries owned by Al Capone. The 
difference from the described example is the fact that they charge invoices for 
goods or services that do not exist in reality, although they do not deliver goods 
nor services, but give the appearance of legal transactions through false invoices 
and balance sheets. 
Given that the point is to “launder” money through legal business, legal activities 
that are often chosen involve a large flow of cash, such as brokerage activities, 
betting houses, bars, car washes or casinos. In the mentioned activities, in the 
manner already described, dirty money is shown in the balance sheets, i.e. it is 
mixed with legal income from jobs that come from performing legal activities. 
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The money laundering process has several weak points or phases where it can be 
detected in the easiest way: 
– entry of cash into the financial system - given that it is difficult to legally 
deposit large amounts in financial institutions, this is the most vulnerable 
phase for money launderers; 
– transferring - most countries have regulated the reporting of suspicious 
or unusual transactions to regulators and 
– cross-border movement of cash - the money launderer is exposed to the 
risk when crossing the border that customs officers will discover him/her 
or as the person transferring cash. 
An informal money transfer system that functions outside the formal financial 
systems has been known as hawala for centuries. Hawala transactions are char-
acterized by their anonymity and poor record keeping, which, combined with a 
lack of legal regulation and transparency, makes it suitable for money laundering 
(Keene, 2007, p. 6). Hawala in the Middle East and Asia has been an elaborated 
system of financial transactions for centuries. This system was introduced by 
Arab traders and caravan owners to insure themselves from looting. The essence 
of this system is a network of intermediaries - hawaladars. Namely, hawaladars 
transfer money quickly, in the greatest confidence, and transactions are per-
formed in inaccessible villages without any trace. This system is therefore based 
solely on mutual trust. So, hawala is the transfer of money without a physical 
change of the owner of the initial shipment, i.e. without physical movement of 
money (Radivojac&Grujić, 2018, p. 95). 
The described process of underground or alternative banking is also hawala 
money transfer. For example, let the sender of dirty money be a B&H citizen 
residing in Germany but his residence visa has expired, which makes his stay in 
Germany illegal. Suppose he wants to send money to someone in B&H. For this 
purpose, he cannot use a formal way of transferring money because he could be 
discovered as a foreigner with illegal residence. He will get in touch with hawala 
intermediary X. He will hand him the amount of money he wants to send to an 
associate in B&H. They can agree on a password to receive the money and the 
intermediary will charge the sender a certain commission for his service. Inter-
mediary X takes a certain commission and contacts another intermediary Y in 
Miloš Grujić et al. CERTAIN MANIFESTATION FORMS AND PROVING MONEY … 
186 http://www.ae.ef.unibl.org/ 
B&H and informs him of the agreed password. Intermediary Y agrees to pay the 
person in B&H the money he already has with him. Intermediary Y contacts a 
person from B&H. After hearing the agreed password from him, he hands him 
the money and receives a certain commission for it. The result of the transfer is 
that intermediary X owes intermediary Y the money that intermediary Y paid to 
the person in B&H. 
According to FATF (2012), the described transaction mode is considered a basic 
model involving a minimum of four participants (FATF, 2012; Keene, 2007). In 
addition to this basic model, there are variations of the model that include differ-
ent numbers of participants, methods of paying commissions and arranging de-
livery and passwords. However, the most important characteristics of the system 
is trust. Namely, “without mutual trust between the participants, there could be 
no transfer of money” (de Bunt, 2008, p. 116). As a password, a word, several 
words, combinations of numbers of according dates, words from the Quran or 
some people’s proverbs can be used for a transaction. In recent times, anonymity 
in the absence of a written trace has been merely a myth (Passas, 2005, p. 17). 
Namely, given that communication between intermediaries and users takes place 
over the telephone and on the Internet, a trace still remains (de Bunt, 2008, p. 
116). In addition, an important characteristics of the system is that the fees by 
transfer charged by intermediaries are lower than those charged by banks or other 
financial institutions (Passas, 2005, p. 7). Also, cryptocurrencies can be an ideal 
way for hawala transfer and money laundering. Almost every cryptocurrency 
owner can use them to pay what he wants and to whom he wants, while main-
taining anonymity. According to the described process, the future of cryptocur-
rencies can be an improved version of the described process (Chart 1) without 
intermediaries. Moreover, the sender can take advantage of the fact that both he 
and the associate have simultaneous Internet access. Through Team Viewer soft-
ware, which allows remote control using a password, it is possible to have access 
to a friend’s computer, transfer your cryptocurrencies to his wallet and exchange 
them for real money (Radivojac&Grujić, 2018, p. 95). 
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Chart 1. Hawala Process 
Source: Illustration of the author 
The term “emerging market” encompasses countries characterized by “institu-
tional turbulence and low levels of economic development in relation to devel-
oped countries” (Welsh et al., 2006, pp. 130-149). Accordingly, an emerging 
market can represent a country or a market where the transition of a political or 
economic system and economic development is higher than a single-digit per-
centage per year (Fan, 2008, p. 353-358). Hoskisson et al. (2000, pp. 249-267) 
classify all Western Balkan countries as emerging markets. An emerging market 
is a market that has some characteristics of a developed market, but does not 
fully meet its standards. 
Julien Vercueil (2012) recently proposed a pragmatic definition of an “emerging 
economy,” which differs from an “emerging market” created bythe approach 
heavily influenced by financial criteria. According to his definition, an emerging 
economy shows the following characteristics (p. 232): 
– Transitional income: Its PPP per capita ranges between 10% and 75% of 
the average per capita income in the EU. 
– Renewing growth: Over the last decade or so, it has experienced strong 
economic growth that has narrowed the gap between incomes and ad-
vanced economies. 
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– Institutional transformations and opening of the economy: In the same 
period it undertook deep institutional transformations that contributed to 
its integration into the world economy. 
3. RESULTS 
Today, more than 50 countries, representing 60% of the world’s population and 
45% of its GDP, meet the criteria of “emerging markets”. In the last few years, 
new acronyms have emerged to describe the largest developing countries, such 
as the BRIC, representing Brazil, Russia, India, and China, (Farah, 2006), along 
with BRICET (BRIC + Eastern Europe and Turkey), BRICS (BRIC + South Af-
rica), BRICM (BRIC + Mexico), MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Tur-
key), NEXT 11 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam) and CIVETI (Colombia, Indo-
nesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) (Table 1). These countries do 
not have a lot of common characteristics, but many authors believe that they 
enjoy an “increasing role in the world economy and on political platforms” 
(Guegan, Hassani, & Zhao, 2013). 
Table 1. Overview of developing countries by different sources and classifications  
Country  MMF 
BRICS+Next 
Eleven S&P 
EM bond in-
dex 
Columbia University 
EMGP 
Argentina +   + + 
Bangladesh + +  +  
Brazil +  + + + 
Bulgaria +     
Chile +  + + + 
China +  + + + 
Columbia +  + + + 
Czech Re-
public   + +  
Egypt  + + + + 
Greece   +   
Hungary +  + + + 
India +  + + + 
Indonesia + + + +  
Iran  +    
Israel    + + 
Malesia +  +  + 
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Country  MMF 
BRICS+Next 
Eleven S&P 
EM bond in-
dex 
Columbia University 
EMGP 
Mauritius     + 
Mexico + + + + + 
Morocco + + + + + 
Nigeria    +  
Oman    +  
Pakistan + + + +  
Peru +  + +  
Philippines + + + + + 
Poland +   +  
Qatar   + +  
Rumania +   +  
Russia + + + + + 
SouthAfrica + + + + + 
SouthKorea  +   + 
Taiwan   + + + 
Thailand +  + + + 
Turkey + + + + + 
Ukraine +   +  
UAE   + + + 
Venezuela +   +  
Vietnam  +  +  
Source: International Monetary Fund. (2020).World Economic Outlook Reports. Wash-
ington: International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Is-
sues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020; Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment - CCSI. 
(2020). Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/publica-
tions/emgp/J.P. Morgan (2016).Emerging Markets Bond Index Monitor. 
It can be said that these countries are characterized by common characteristics 
such as institutional turbulence and a lower level of corporate governance and 
economic development compared to developed countries (Grujić, 2019, p. 54-
55). 
In comparison to highly developed countries (USA, Australia, UK, Italy, Ger-
many, France and Canada), developing markets are characterized by a high level 
of corruption as a consequence of the (post) socialist system (Transparency In-
ternational, 2016), but also poor financial market development compared to other 
countries.  
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Chart 2. Development of financial market and GDP per capita in countries 
Source: Overview of the author. Data are listed according to: International Monetary 
Fund (n.d.). Financial Development Index Database. 
https://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B 
4. DISCUSSION  
In the criminal law terms, proving is a part of criminal proceedings in which 
legally relevant facts are established, those that are important for deciding on the 
matter (Simović, Simović, 2016, p. 338). The means of evidence are important 
as sources from which the evidence bases and proving actions are obtained, as 
procedures which the facts collected in criminal proceedings arein line with. It 
is understood that: “presentation of evidence implies the useof, in the manner 
prescribed by law, evidence, in order to find out the facts that are the subject of 
proving” (Simović, Simović, 2016, p. 338). 
In that aspect, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republika 
Srpska (2012) also refer to proving of money laundering in criminal cases. Thus, 
the basic right and duties of the Prosecutor is to detect and prosecute perpetrators 
of criminal offenses (Article 43, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 
the Republika Srpska), whereby he bears the legal duty to prove the truth of his 
claims (Simović, Simović, 2016, p. 336). However, due to the social danger and 
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harmful consequences of serious crimes, over the last few years there has been a 
clear trend according to which the development of criminal law for crimes within 
activities of the organized crime in many countries leads to the reverse burden 
of proving. Truth be told, this creates a problem of violating some of the basic 
principles of criminal procedure, such as the right to a fair trial and the presump-
tion of innocence (Katušić-Jergović, 2007, p. 637) and the principle in dubio pro 
reo (in case of doubt, in favour of a suspect, i.e. accused) (Article 3 of the Crim-
inal Procedure Code of the Republika Srpska). 
In order to improve the effectiveness of criminal legislation and competent au-
thorities in domestic law to combat money laundering and organized crime, the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and 
the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances (1988) in Articles 6 and 7 and 4 and 5, respectively, rec-
ommended that States Parties, in accordance with domestic principles and pro-
cedures, foresee the possibility of requiring the perpetrator to prove that the in-
come or property alleged to have been acquired by proceeds of crime, which the 
perpetrator possesses, was acquired in a lawful manner. 
The practical implementation of this measure could certainly increase the effi-
ciency of the judiciary in the fight against money laundering, but the problem is 
imposed with the opposite side of the principles with the outlined principles of 
criminal procedure. However, the European Court of Human Rights - ECHR has 
incorporated in its practice standards according to which such a possibility is 
allowed to a certain extent (cited in: Katušić-Jergović, 2007, 638).7The conclu-
                                                     
 Conclusions from the ECHR court practice are the following: 
- Presumption of innocence applies to the criminal proceedings as a whole, including the confis-
cation order as a part of the proceedings, and compliance with that presumption must be assessed 
for the entire proceedings and not for each stage individually. 
- The use of material or legal presumptions is permissible within reasonable limits and should be 
proportionate with the importance of the case (principle of proportionality), and the right of defense 
(principle of equal representation) should be maintained. Assumptions must not be irrefutable in 
any way and the court must have the possibility of free assessment, which is why full transfer of 
the burden of proof or general confiscation is not permitted. 
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sion is particularly interesting that the silence of the accused in criminal proceed-
ings can be taken as an additional sign of guilt, if on the other hand the prosecutor 
has provided clear accusations and evidence. This has opened the way for many 
countries to apply the principle of the reverse burden of proof, especially in sit-
uations of combating serious crime with a cross-border element. 
Given that the principle of the reverse burden of proof has become the practice 
of the European Court of Human Rights and that B&H partially applies it, its full 
introduction into domestic legislation should be carefully considered, with all the 
difficulties and dangers that one could face. Therefore, the principle of the re-
verse burden of proof could be extremely important in all subsequent proceed-
ings related to the fight against money laundering in B&H. 
It is clear that financial investigation and expert evaluation are perhaps the most 
important activities in detecting and proving money laundering. The financial 
investigation is primarily related to the confiscation of property resulting from 
the commission of a criminal offense8, while expert evaluation plays a key role 
in proving money laundering. The financial investigation determines the pro-
ceeds of crime, as well as the property that can be confiscated (Lukić, 2009, p. 
387, 389). On the other hand, expert evaluation is done when, in order to estab-
lish or assess an important fact, the findings and opinion of persons who have 
                                                     
- The right to remain silent that could incriminate that same person during the proceedings, as a 
part of the right to a fair trial, is subject to a strict interpretation of the ECHR, but not absolutely: 
when sufficient and clear allegations and evidence are made, it can be considered an additional 
sign of guilt if the accused does not want to reply to any question. Statements obtained in admin-
istrative proceedings in which the accused is obliged to tell the truth are not admissible in further 
criminal proceedings. 
- The ECHR provides an independent definition of the terms “punishment” and “measure” and the 
applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights depends on these qualifications. The 
relevant criteria are whether the measure was imposed after the conviction of the accused for the 
criminal activity, what type and the purpose of the measure are, its characteristics according to the 
rules of domestic law, the procedures regarding the adoption and implementation of the measure 
and its gravity (stated in line with: Katušić-Jergović, 2007: 638). 
 In thissense, it is necessary to make difference between confiscation of proceeds, as a specific 
criminal law measure (no one canreta in the proceeds of crime, Article 8 of the Criminal Code of 
Republika Srpska) andconfiscation of proceeds of crime, as a form of stateresponse to seriousforms 
of crime(compare: Lukić, 2009). 
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the necessary professional knowledge need to be obtained (Article 160 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code of Republika Srpska). The purpose of the expert eval-
uation is to provide the prosecutor and the court with explanations and infor-
mation that require the expert knowledge. The most common expert evaluations 
used by the prosecutor in these cases include: economic and financial expert 
evaluation of business books, forensic expert evaluation of computers, mobile 
phones - smartphones and other devices for storing and processing electronic 
data, graphological expert evaluation of disputed documents, etc. The practice is 
that the expert evaluator prepares and submits a report to the prosecutor on the 
conducted expert evaluation, which contains: finding and opinion; expert evalu-
ation methodology; the evidence he examined; tests performed; working mate-
rial, sketches and notes; all other relevant data for fair and objective analysis. It 
is not uncommon for expert evaluator to be asked for a list of professional liter-
ature used by the expert for the purpose of expert evaluation to explain how the 
expert came to a particular opinion (USAID, 2019, p. 220). 
When it comes to a person and/or a group suspected of money laundering, con-
ducting a high quality and efficient financial investigation presents a complex 
task for the prosecutor and the investigation team. The prosecutor should direct 
the conduct of the financial investigation to determine the assets, expenses, bank-
ing and other financial transactions and the manner in which the criminal offense 
was committed, and the connection between the income of the suspect or sus-
pects. At the same time, it is obvious that it is not enough to establish that the 
legal entity operated illegally or that the legal origin of the income and property 
of the suspects cannot be determined. It is necessary to determine whether the 
amounts of money and the time frame of the inflow into the bank accounts of 
legal entities and suspects correspond to the amount of material gain that was 
determined to have been acquired by committing a criminal offense. Investiga-
tors and expert evaluators should pay special attention to data on the use of cash 
and the correlation of financial statements of legal entities with the income and 
assets of natural persons - suspects and banking transactions. 
Also, special attention should be paid to the use of legal entities, the so-called 
fictitious or phantom companies, for the crime of money laundering, which fur-
ther complicates the task of the investigation team. In these cases, the prosecutor 
should assess whether to conduct a single investigation against legal entities for 
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all actions or possibly to form other cases and identify actions that can be proven 
in order to conduct the investigation effectively. In these cases, the prosecutor 
may order the implementation of the necessary expert evaluation, which may be: 
forensic expert evaluation of computers and mobile phones, graphological expert 
evaluation of disputed documents and financial expert evaluation. Forensic ex-
pert evaluation should be aimed at collecting data on the roles and work of group 
members and organizers, as well as the manner in which predicate offenses are 
committed. 
In the case of fictitious companies, it is necessary to determine many details that 
include everything from the entry in the court register, the identity of the com-
pany and related parties, the transfer of ownership shares, business operations 
through accounts, balance sheet analysis and the similar. 
5. CONCLUSION  
Money laundering as a criminal phenomenon, although present for decades, is 
still not sufficiently researched. Moreover, its simplified understanding seems to 
lead to the trivialization of this problem. Money laundering is a derivative form 
of crime and is organically linked to the organized crime. As a separate act, 
money laundering can not exist in the legal system, but there are many forms and 
types of laundering, and the attention was given to one of them in this paper. 
Ideal money laundering activities are activities where many things are paid in 
cash. The main motive, therefore, is not just earnings. That money has already 
been earned. Profits gained through illegal activities will be even reduced 
through taxation. However, the money will be introduced into legal flows. 
As the easiest and most effective of all known approaches in the fight against 
dirty money, it is proposed to legalize “brighter” activities which “dirty” money 
comes from, such as soft drugs or gambling. One of the measures to combat 
money laundering may be to encourage card payments. Such measures will cer-
tainly not completely stop money launderers, but they will slow them down by 
leading them to be more imaginative. However, online payment also gives a lot 
of space for illegal activities. 
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The very phenomenon of “money laundering” is a consequence of criminogenic 
activities. By money laundering, the perpetrators hide the real origin and owner-
ship of “dirty money”, and other property or rights acquired through criminal 
acts. Therefore, money laundering results from the commission of other criminal 
offenses so that property acquired through such proceedings will never be legal 
under the law and the money laundering proceedings can only be successful 
when its true source or ownership can be concealed. 
The task of the professional community (court experts, accountants, auditors, tax 
advisors, lawyers, notaries) but also of the academic community in the preven-
tion of money laundering and terrorist financing should be focused on the appli-
cation of the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorist 
Activities and all by-laws (rulebooks) adopted on the basis of that law. Also, 
cooperation with international institutions is desirable. The most famous are the 
Anti-Money Laundering Global Task Force, the Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
and Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe. This also in-
cludes adhering to professional guidelines and recognizing indicators of suspi-
cious transactions. Therefore, it is necessary to insist on further education of all 
sectors and intensive campaigns that will point out all the potential dangers lurk-
ing in case of any connection with money laundering activities. 
The direction of further research should include the problem of the grey econ-
omy, but also the process of inverse money laundering. It is a process that masks 
a legitimate source of funds used for illegal purposes. 
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ПОЈЕДИНИ ОБЛИЦИ ИСПОЉАВАЊА И 
ДОКАЗИВАЊЕ ПРАЊА НОВЦА НА НОВОМ 
ТРЖИШТУ  
1 Милош Грујић, Друштво за управљање Пензијским резервним фондом Републике 
Српске а.д. Бања Лука, 
2 Миле Шикман, Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци 
САЖЕТАК 
Прање новца, у својој скоро 90 година дугој историји, изазива пажњу на-
учне, стручне, али и опште јавности. Кроз комплетан период мијењали су 
се појавни облици овог криминалног феномена, његова типологија, етио-
лошки фактори, и др., али је суштина остала иста: превођење нелегално 
стеченог новца у легалне финансијске токове. Посебно су оптерећена 
тржишта у развоју, што је и предмет овог рада: идентификовање, праћење 
и доказивање процеса прања новца с циљем његовог смањивања у земљама 
у развоју. Поред тога, оно што се уочава на овим тржиштима јесте да су 
послови прања новца углавном повезани са оним дјелатностима у којима 
се највећи дио плаћања обавља у готовини. Њихова специфичност, односно 
основни мотив извршења, није тек зарада већ тежња да се „прљави” новац 
уведе у легалне токове. Циљ рада јесте да се методом дескрипције понуди 
научно објашњење и опис процеса прања новца, сузбијање, те појаве са фо-
кусом на процес прања новца. Осим тога, у раду се описују модели и слабе 
тачке тог процеса, истовремено уважавајући стандарде и специфичности 
пословања на тржиштима у развоју. Такође, у раду даје осврт на прање 
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новца у XXИ вијеку у малим и отвореним економијама, укључујући и 
приједлоге за спречавање и сузбијање ове негативне појаве. 
Кључне ријечи: прање новца, тржишта у развоју, незаконито понашање, 
спровођење закона. 
 
